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Abstract: The Internet is a transformative technology that terrorists are exploiting for the spread of 
propaganda and radicalizing new recruits. While al-Qaeda has a longer history, Islamic State is 
conducting a modern and sophisticated media campaign centered around online social networking. 
This article introduces and contextualizes the contributions to this Special Issue by examining some of 
the ways in which terrorists make use of the Internet as part of their broader media strategies.   
 
  
In October 2014, three teenage girls from Denver, Colorado, were noticed missing from high school.1 
German authorities intercepted them at the Frankfurt airport and sent them back to the U.S. where 
they were questioned by FBI agents. The girls were suspected of heading to Turkey then Syria to join 
Islamic extremists although details of the case were sealed because of their ages (15 to 17). All three 
had browsed extremist websites to research how to get to Syria. Earlier that year, in January,19 year 
old Shannon Conley was arrested at Denver International Airport en route to Syria via Frankfurt and 
Turkey. Charged with conspiracy to help the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq 
and al Sham, also known as Daesh) in Syria, she admitted to ‘radicalization’2 by a Tunisian militant 
who she had met online and intended to marry. Conley said that her knowledge of Islam was based 
solely on her own online research. 3 
Similarly alarming stories of radicalization are repeated regularly in the news media and 
beyond. Indeed, according to some of the more hysterical reports, more British citizens joined IS in 
Iraq and Syria than enlisted in the UK Army Reserve in 2013 (several hundred compared to 170).4 
Reports such as these are invariably accompanied by two types of causal question.5 First is a question 
of direct causation: Why do young men and women want to leave often comfortable lives in order to 
join violent extremists in distant countries? Second, is a question of enabling causes: How important 
is the influence of the Internet in this process? What role does it play in encouraging or facilitating 
efforts to participate in campaigns such as those waged by al-Qaeda or IS? 
 
Terrorism, Technology and the Internet 
The types of violence now typically described as terrorism, of course, existed long before the Internet 
but, as everyone is aware, the Internet has been an enormously transformative technology. Digital 
divides notwithstanding, it is literally at our fingertips; about one in four people on Earth today carries 
a smartphone that allows instant connection to the Internet.6 Facebook counts close to 1.5 billion 
active users, almost 20 percent of the world population. Unsurprisingly, the Internet has been 
embraced by terrorists for the same reasons as it has by other organizations, including its capacity to 
expand reach and influence.7 If terrorism is understood as a form of communicative violence, and 
  
spreading propaganda and attracting attention are therefore central to it, then an online presence is 
logically even more vital to terrorists than it is many other organizations. Recent studies have 
identified thousands of overtly jihadi websites operating on the Internet today.8 IS has been 
particularly active and successful in recruiting foreign fighters, notably from Europe and America, 
using Twitter, Youtube, Diaspora, and other online social networks.  
The Internet offers obvious and unique advantages over older media such as radio and 
television. Virtually anyone can set up a website easily and inexpensively to publish literature, 
images, videos, and software. The message can be completely controlled by the author-publisher and 
is not dependent on news reporters or government approval or mediation (television stations are state 
operated in many countries). More important, though, is the opportunity presented by new media 
technologies for two-way interactivity through forums, chat rooms, email, texts. Terrorists can 
connect directly with various audiences, and those audiences, in turn, can become active participants 
in an unfolding conversation. A sense of virtual community can therefore be fostered, which is often 
not possible with more traditional forms of broadcast media like radio and television.  
Terrorists recognize that the Internet is a powerful tool to utilize deliberately and tactically to 
advance their strategic objectives. In order to properly understand online propaganda and 
radicalization – the theme of this special issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism – the Internet should 
be examined within the broader context of other tools in terrorists' media strategies.   
 
Online Propaganda Strategies 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, current head of al-Qaeda and former deputy to Osama bin Laden once said, “We 
[al-Qaeda] are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the 
media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our people”.9 Al-Qaeda 
has been able to adapt its media strategy to changing circumstances and technologies over the years. 
Initially al-Qaeda concentrated on aiming propaganda, mostly videos and pamphlets, internally to its 
own members, contributing to the construction of something of a personality cult around Osama bin 
Laden.10 Through the 1990s, al-Qaeda began expanding its reach throughout the West with interviews 
  
of bin Laden being given to prominent Western journalists such as Robert Fisk. At the same time, al-
Qaeda strived to build support in the Muslim world, including through the Al-Jazeera television 
network, mainly via interviews of bin Laden or his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
In 2001, the focus of al-Qaeda’s media strategy turned toward attacks and kidnappings, 
starting with a long video recording of the attack on the USS Cole destroyer in October 2000. With 
attention from the 9/11 attack, al-Qaeda shifted their propaganda internationally. An example of its 
new focus was the filming of the kidnapping and assassination of American journalist Daniel Pearl in 
2002. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda had one website which was only in Arabic. Post 9/11, al-Qaeda expanded 
its propaganda campaign through its website (al_nida.com) establishing a special media production 
division, al-Sahab, for audiovisual tapes and CDs for distribution through Arab television channels 
and a growing number of jihadist websites in different languages.  
Much of the propaganda was aimed at the Muslim mainstream because a central objective of 
al-Qaeda's propaganda strategy was winning the support of the Muslim ummah. However, al-Qaeda 
recognized the necessity to engage its enemy on several fronts simultaneously. Its propaganda was 
therefore also aimed at maximizing the impact of terrorism to inflict damage upon the ‘far enemy’ of  
the US and its allies, and mobilizing Western Muslims against their own governments.11 The Internet 
served as the prime channel for distributing propagandist materials, complemented by radio and 
satellite TV channels and print media. In turn, al-Qaeda relied increasingly on young adults with 
technology skills to improve the quality of propaganda materials distributed on the Internet and social 
networking sites, and expanded media production outlets such as Al-Furquan, As-Sahab Media, 
Media Commission, and Sawt al-Jihad.  
Although IS traces its origins to bin Laden, it split decisively from al‑Qaeda in February 2014 
and its current leader is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.12 The ideology and propaganda strategy of IS differ 
from those of al‑Qaeda. Although the relationship between politics and religion is always a complex 
one,13 IS has articulated a desire for returning to a particular reading of early Islam and the "Prophetic 
methodology” referring to the prophecy and example of Muhammad. Following takfiri doctrine, it is 
committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people. Unlike al-Qaeda’s focus on the 
  
Western enemy, IS is more concerned with the application of Sharia in the caliphate and expansion of 
local territory, although the recent 13 November 2015 coordinated attacks in Paris suggest an 
expansion of their agenda to the international stage. 
IS's propaganda strategy is modern and sophisticated, which includes not only extensive use 
of online social networking but also high quality video production and publications. A highly 
publicized instance was a slickly produced video of the beheading of American journalist James Foley 
in August 2014. The New York Post published a graphic image on its front page, and screenshots 
from the video spread widely on Twitter. Most media outlets and journalists declined to share the 
graphic video or photos, but IS was aware that social media was an easy way to bypass the checks 
used by media organizations to stop the spread of propaganda.   
IS publishes annual reports on its progress complete with high quality illustrations and 
infographics. Reports are filled with attack metrics, an approach emulating modern metrics-oriented 
corporations. The effect is to “communicate organizational efficacy to outside parties, such as donors, 
al-Qaeda groups, and adversaries,” according to a report by the Institute for the Study of War.14 
IS's sophisticated propaganda campaign depends prominently on social networking. 
Thousands of IS's Twitter followers installed a custom-developed app called Dawn of Glad Tidings 
that allows IS to send out centrally written tweets through their accounts. Released simultaneously, 
the messages swamp social media and extend IS's online presence much further than normal. In 
addition to centralized Twitter accounts, provincial accounts publish live feeds about local IS 
operations. Also, an online fan club of thousands of IS supporters retweets its hashtags and translates 
messages from Arabic to Western languages.  
Everything done in IS's propaganda strategy has a combined effect to build the "brand". IS 
has additional advantages over al‑Qaeda: more money; weapons and battle experience; and help from 
a growing number of Western recruits who bring technology skills and English skills. IS also appears 
deliberately to use English in posts and some videos, including in execution of James Foley in the 
above-noted video. 
  
While the news media tend to focus on IS's barbarism, its propaganda strategy has been 
described as much broader, encompassing five additional narratives: (1) mercy (as opposed to 
brutality); (2) victimhood, e.g., collateral damage blamed on the enemy; (3) war or military gains; (4) 
belonging (appealling to especially foreign recruits with friendship, security, and a sense of 
belonging); and (5) utopianism, i.e., not just talking about the caliphate but enacting it.15 In other 
words, IS's propaganda is intended to appeal to a broad audience, not only bloodthirsty fighters, which 
helps to explain its recruitment success.  
 
Online Radicalization Strategies 
A US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs report on violent Islamist 
extremism and the internet16 argued that the Internet campaign by al-Qaeda affects a viewer in 
different ways across discrete stages of radicalization. During the first stage of pre-radicalization and 
self-identification, an individual may be interested in learning more about the ideology. Websites will 
lead them directly to the group’s enlistment pages with articles about religious beliefs and core 
ideologies. The next stage is one of indoctrination when individuals, having accepted the core 
ideologies and beliefs, seek ways to participate and further the goals of the organization. In the 
subsequent stage of jihadization, the Internet allows individuals to connect with other recruits and 
organization members in order to plan and carry out their own attacks. 
In the movement toward that which has been termed al-Qaeda 2.0,17 it may be that al-Qaeda 
does not depend on the Internet for recruitment as much as it relies on the tendency of individuals to 
seek out the websites and contact the organization, or in other words, radicalize and indoctrinate 
themselves.18 Al-Qaeda's recruitment process via the Internet follows a bottom-up strategy in which 
sympathizers, who are predisposed to be affected by propaganda, and perhaps indoctrinate themselves 
by repeatedly exposing themselves to these sites and videos.19.  
IS is believed to operate one of the most sophisticated social media campaigns. It is highly 
visible and well funded. Reportedly, IS also benefits from its considerable wealth, earning £3 million 
a day through oil smuggling, extortion, theft and human trafficking. It is deliberately slanted toward 
  
foreigners, both in its content and its target audience. For instance, IS produced a 20-minute video at 
the end of Ramadan in August 2014 that highlighted shots of the Mujahideen repeating variations of 
the same message — British, Finnish, Indonesian, Moroccan, Belgian, American, and South African. 
Important IS messages are commonly released simultaneously in English, French, and German, then 
later translated into other languages, such as Russian, Indonesian, and Urdu. According to Thomas 
Hegghammer in an interview with BillMoyers.com, “Foreign fighters are overrepresented, it seems, 
among the perpetrators of the Islamic State’s worst acts. So they help kind of radicalize the conflict — 
make it more brutal. They probably also make the conflict more intractable, because the people who 
come as foreign fighters are, on average, more ideological than the typical Syrian rebel.” 
Doctrine requires believers to reside in the caliphate if it is at all possible for them to do so. 
An exact number of foreign fighters is almost impossible to estimate due to the dangers for journalists 
and intelligence operatives. Open-source estimates have varied widely. The majority of fighters have 
come from the Middle East and North Africa, especially Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. The rest have 
come from other places including former Soviet republics, the Americas, and Australia. Government 
estimates on the number of Americans joining IS have varied around the range of approximately 30 to 
100. Estimates for UK are similarly difficult but usually higher, e.g., news reports have cited 500 
British citizens affiliated with IS in Syria and Iraq. French and German fighters have also been 
observed in large numbers on social media, suggesting perhaps more than 550 fighters from Germany 
and more than 1,000 from France.  
A typical jihadi foreign fighter is a male between 18 to 29 years old, according to the Soufan 
Group, although there are many exceptions both younger and older. Beyond age and gender, there is 
no reliable profile of who is most likely to become a foreign fighter. After four decades of research on 
radicalization, no common socio-economic or religious pathway toward violence has been found, and 
the term itself is characterized by considerable contestability.  
Radicalization has not been limited to men. IS has featured women among their most vocal 
and visible supporters online. Aqsa Mahmood was one of the many women working to recruit 
foreigners to join IS. She chose to leave a typical, seemingly happy teenage life in Glasgow, Scotland. 
She documented her transformation and attraction to radicalism on Tumblr. From Syria, she continued 
  
using Twitter and Tumblr to encourage others to follow her example. The same propaganda and 
extremist narratives luring male foreign fighters have also been tailored for female audiences, 
highlighting the "Muslim" cause, a new "utopian" state, and jihadists who are willing to become 
martyrs in their duty to God. Some women are attracted to a romanticized vision of becoming the wife 
of a jihadist fighting for the ultimate cause (the caliphate), and many foreign girls will be married off 
to foreign fighters upon their arrival.  
IS's strategy has been innovative. IS has seemingly learned from earlier ultraviolent terrorist 
groups who ended up alienating supporters. IS has crafted a novel media campaign mixing narratives 
of brutal violence and utopian idealism. Also, IS's recruitment strategy has differed from al-Qaeda's 
approach of attracting fighters first and radicalizing them later. IS seeks recruits who are further down 
the path toward ideological radicalization or more inclined by personal disposition toward violence. 
When these pre-radicalized fighters and their families arrive in Iraq and Syria, they are exposed to an 
environment filled with violence and death. 
 
Terrorists’ Use of the Internet Symposium 2014 
The papers in this special issue were selected from a multidisciplinary symposium held on the 5th and 
6th June 2014 on the theme of "Terrorists’ Use of the Internet" organized by the Cyberterrorism 
Project and hosted at Swansea University.20 Speakers came from the UK, Republic of Ireland, France, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, Canada and Australia. Sixteen papers spanning a range of different 
disciplines were presented to an audience of academic researchers as well as practitioner 
representatives from policing and policy circles including the UK Home Office, South Wales 
Constabulary and the Scottish Organised Crime and Counterterrorism Police Unit. 
Across the diverse topics presented, several themes appeared to emerge across the event: 
 Definition: There were different perspectives on key terms related to cyberterrorism, 
including definition of cyberterrorism itself. Some debate may be healthy but disagreement on 
basic definitions also have the potential to impede discussion. Moreover, different definitions 
may have important practical ramifications (for example, in developing models of risk 
  
management). Deconstructing different understandings of cyberterrorism has the potential to 
open up a range of other important research questions and create space for dissident voices. 
 Transnational: Many online terrorist activities - publicity, propaganda, radicalization, finance 
- now transcend national boundaries. As a result, international law has a significant role to 
play, and international cooperation is essential. At the same time, it is important to recognize 
that many terrorist groups have a specific geographical focus. 
 Decentralization: Terrorist activities are increasingly decentralized. Examples include the 
outsourcing of propaganda production, bottom-up radicalization and the growing number of 
self-funded terrorist cells. 
 Vulnerability: Computer networks enable cyber attacks to reach any connected targets, 
exposing vulnerable systems to remote attackers. A particular concern in cyberterrorism is 
national critical infrastructures that are both vulnerable and likely to attract terrorist attention. 
Attacks on critical infrastructures could endanger large populations. Vulnerability has another 
meaning as well; citizens are often portrayed as possibly vulnerable to online radicalization. 
 Credibility: The credibility of terroristic narratives and counter narratives is important. So too 
is the credibility of governments’ counterterrorism laws and policies, and the discourse 
surrounding these. This is particularly apparent in the case of cyber surveillance. 
 Power: Terrorist groups employ both hard and soft power in pursuit of their objectives. Whilst 
counterterrorism frequently employs hard forms of response, there are concerns about the 
extent to which soft countermeasures are used and their effectiveness. 
 Evidence: Areas where understanding is currently lacking and further research is required 
include: terrorists’ cyber capabilities and the materials they place online; the consumers of 
extremist online content; the relationship between the Internet and the offline world; the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism laws and policies, including accountability mechanisms and 
how to assess effectiveness; how counterterrorism policies are produced; and, how 
cooperation can be engendered between the private and public sectors and within the 
international community. 
  
 
Special Issue 
The papers collected in this special issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism are organized around the 
theme of online propaganda, publicity and radicalization. It is intended that this collection will 
provide a critical portrayal of current thinking on a subject that is increasingly prominent, seemingly 
straightforward, and yet also controversial. Terrorists do not hide their uses of the Internet for 
spreading their message and propaganda materials, fund raising, and fostering a sense of community. 
These uses of the Internet are clearly evident. Among the less understood and more controversial 
issues is the significance of the Internet in radicalization, which is explored by three of the articles in 
this special issue.  
The introductory article by Martin Rudner sets the general scene examining al-Qaeda's open 
embrace of the Internet as a tool for "electronic jihad." First establishing that al-Qaeda's strategy 
documents call for any and all means including electronic communications to ensure eventual victory, 
the article proceeds to detail how terrorists take advantage of the Internet to: incite fervor and activism 
by spreading their messages and propaganda, particularly importantly reaching the West; recruit new 
members including so-called lone wolf terrorists and foreign jihadists from outside the Muslim world; 
deliver training and indoctrination particularly in weaponry, explosives, and tactics; solicit funds; 
disseminate tactical instructions for planning and carrying out specific attacks, with some examples 
cited; and perpetrate cyber attacks, though cyber terrorism to date has been limited to website 
defacements rather than serious damage to critical infrastructures.21  
In the second article, David Mair investigates the real-time use of Twitter by Somalia-based 
group al Shabaab during a 2013 attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. This was a 
rare instance of a group producing a live feed through a social network of an ongoing attack. Over the 
four days of the Westgate attack, 556 tweets from eight al Shabaab affiliated Twitter accounts were 
analysed in terms of their composition, content, and intended audience. Mair’s investigation asks: 
what was the purpose of tweeting about the attack, and to whom were the tweets directed? The article 
  
presents a number of breakdowns of these messages and discusses their implications for counter 
terrorism. 
The role of the Internet in radicalization is a crucial and controversial issue. The third article 
by Angela Gendron examines how charismatic preachers utilize the Internet to promote violent 
radicalization. According to Gendron, al-Qaeda and IS use social networks and websites to appeal to 
susceptible young Muslims in the West. Relationships are built to groom susceptible individuals 
based on the religious teachings of charismatic preachers and other information and propaganda 
materials. Charismatic preachers operate at the global level acting as "mediators" between the dense 
ideological pronouncements of the movement’s leaders and particular target audiences. Interactive 
sites with online sermons and militant Salafist materials help to bring together like-minded second 
and third generation radicalized Muslims living in the West and reinforce their new found beliefs 
through the relationships they forge online.  
In the Issue’s fourth article, Anne Aly challenges the assumption of causality linking online 
narratives and radicalization to violent extremism. It is often argued that extremist propaganda on the 
Internet transforms individuals who are somehow susceptible to ‘grooming’, inciting them to violence 
on behalf of a cause. This presumption of a vulnerable and passive audience is challenged by Aly. To 
address it, her article proposes a new framework drawing on media theory through which researchers 
might study the audiences who receive and internalize terrorist narratives. The approach studies the 
audience from three levels of analysis focusing on the message, its producers and its consumers as 
well as the relationships between these three. Potentially this framework could contribute to 
understanding how the terrorist message becomes meaningful to certain people and how online 
leaders can mobilize audiences in ways that matter offline. 
In the concluding article, Maura Conway reviews the state of research produced to date on the 
role of the Internet in violent extremism and terrorism. This establishes context for a variety of 
arguments that have been made for and against the significance of the Internet's role. The discussion 
leads to two basic questions regarding the issue of online radicalization: whether it is a real 
phenomenon, and the nature of the process. From these questions, six suggestions are offered by 
Conway through which future research might progress on violent online extremism. 
  
Finally, a word about terrorists' use of the Internet would be incomplete without pointing out 
the downside for terrorists. The Internet is a valuable source of intelligence for law enforcement and 
intelligence organizations, and even journalists who can easily keep an eye on known social media 
accounts.22 Although some forums may be vetted and password protected, there is no doubt that law 
enforcement prefers the status quo over possible alternatives where terrorists turn to more stealthy and 
covert technologies. Perhaps that explains why the US government has shown surprisingly little effort 
to formulate a clear strategy to counter IS's online recruitment campaign.23 For those involved in law 
enforcement, an enemy in plain sight is better than one who is unseen.  
 
                                                 
1 Ben Brumfield, “Officials: 3 Denver girls played hooky from school and tried to join ISIS”, CNN, October 22, 
2014, accessed August 30, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/22/us/colorado-teens-syria-odyssey/index.html. 
2 The term ‘radicalization’ is, of course, a controversial one. For a useful critical overview of its genealogy and 
usage, see Arun Kundnani, “Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept”, in Counter-Radicalisation: Critical 
Perspectives, ed. Christopher Baker-Beall, Charlotte Heath-Kelly, and Lee Jarvis (Abingdon: Routledge: 2015), 
1-13. 
3 The limited religious literacy of many individuals drawn to the Islamic State is also evidenced in the case of 
Mohammed Ahmed and Yusuf Sarwar. As Akil Awan notes, these: “young British men from Birmingham who 
were jailed for travelling to Syria to join and fight alongside a jihadist group in 2013, in response to what they 
saw as their religious duty. But it was the reading material they purchased to accompany them on their trip, the 
books, Islam for Dummies and The Koran for Dummies, which are most revealing about their lack of religious 
literacy and motivation.” See Akil Awan, “The Charlie Hebdo Attack: The Double Alienation Dilemma”, The 
National Interest, January 13, 2015, accessed September 7, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-charlie-
hebdo-attack-the-double-alienation-dilemma-12021. 
4 Tom McTague, “More Brits signing up to fight with jihadist militants in Iraq and Syria than for the UK Army 
Reserve”, Daily Mail, June 17, 2014, accessed August 30, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2659237/More-Brits-signing-fight-jihadist-militants-Iraq-Syria-UK-Army-Reserve.html. 
5 See Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13(4) (1981): 379-399. 
6 “Number of smartphone users worldwide from 2014 to 2019 (in millions),” Statista, accessed August 30, 2015, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/330695/number-of-smartphone-users-worldwide/. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
7 For fuller overviews than permitted here, see: Gabriel Weimann, www.Terror.Net: How Modern Terrorism 
Uses the Internet, Special Report 116 (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2004); Maura 
Conway, “Terrorism and the Internet: new media-new threat?” Parliamentary Affairs 59(2) (2006): 283-298; 
Stuart Macdonald and David Mair, “Terrorism Online: A New Strategic Environment”, in Terrorism Online: 
Politics, Law and Technology, ed. Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and Thomas M. Chen (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2015): 10-34. 
8 See Dorothy Denning, “Terror’s Web: How the Internet is Transforming Terrorism”, in Handbook of Internet 
Crime, ed. Yvonne Jewkes and Majid Yar (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011): 194-213. 
9 Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, Violent Islamist extremism, the internet, and the homegrown terrorist 
threat (Washington D. C.: United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
2008), accessed August 30, 2015, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=485776. 
10 Manuel Torres, Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh, “Analysis and evolution of the global jihadist movement 
propaganda,” Terrorism & Political Violence 18(3) (2006): 399-421.  
11 Angela Gendron, Al Qaeda: Propaganda and Media Strategy, ITAC Trends in Terrorism Series, vol 2007-2 
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, 2007). 
12 For useful introductions, see Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (London, William 
Collins, 2015); Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (London: 
Verso, 2014). 
13 See, for example, Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson, “What's so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?” 
Critical Studies on Terrorism 4(3) (2011): 369-388. 
14 Alex Bilger, “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal a Metrics-Driven Military Command,” Institute for the Study of 
War, May 22, 2014, accessed August 30, 2015, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ISIS-Annual-
Reports-Reveal-Military-Organization. 
15 Charlie Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy (London: The 
Quilliam Foundation, 2015). 
16 Lieberman and Collins, Violent Islamist extremism. 
17 See Jerrold Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
18 Jeremy White, “Virtual indoctrination and the digihad: The evolution of Al-Qaeda’s media strategy,” Small 
Wars Journal, November 19, 2012, accessed August 30, 2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/virtual-
indoctrination-and-the-digihad. 
19 Ibid.  
20 For more information on the Cyberterrorism Project, please see: http://www.cyberterrorism-project.org 
(accessed September 7, 2015). 
21 For an overview see Thomas M. Chen, Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald, eds., Cyberterrorism: 
Understanding, Assessment and Response (New York, NY: Springer, 2014). 
22 Peter R. Neumann, “Options and strategies for countering online radicalization in the United States,” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism 36(6) (2013): 431-459.  
23 Joseph Lieberman and Christian Beckner, “The Homegrown Jihadist Threat Grows,” The Wall Street Journal, 
October 23, 2014, accessed August 30, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/joseph-lieberman-and-christian-
beckner-the-homegrown-jihadist-threat-grows-1414106398. 
